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ATTN PETER RODMAN, SECRETARY'S PARTY

RABIN DISCUSSES U.S. ROLE, ISRAELI POSITION IN SETTLEMENT TALKS

TA010720Y TAKE 1 OF 4--RABIN AL HAMISHMAR INTERVIEW

TEL AVIV 'AL HAMISHMAR SUPPLEMENT 30 MAY 75 PP 4-7 TA

((INTERVIEW OF PRIME MINISTER YIZHAQ RABIN BY A PANEL OF

'AL HAMISHMAR JOURNALISTS--TIME AND PLACE OF INTERVIEW NOT GIVEN))

((EXCERPTS)) ((PASSAGE OMITTED)) ((QUESTION)) HOW SHOULD WE  
VIEW THE LETTER OF THE SENATORS? IS IT RIGHT TO SAY THAT THIS IS  
AN UNRESERVED SUPPORT?

((ANSWER)) THE LETTER OF THE 76 RPT 76 SENATORS IS OF POLITICAL  
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT ISRAEL  
WILL HAVE A FREE HAND TO PRESENT STANDS AS IT WISHES--ONE SHOULD  
BE CAREFUL ABOUT THE INTERPRETATION--OR THAT THERE IS NO DEMAND  
BY CONGRESS TO CONTINUE THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS AND TO ADVANCE  
TOWARD PEACE. NEVERTHELESS, THE FIRM STAND ON CENTRAL ISSUES  
EXISTS, BOTH IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONTINUATION OF AIR FOR THE  
STATE'S SECURITY AND ECONOMY AND FOR CENTRAL POINTS OF A POLITICAL  
SOLUTION. THESE STANDS ARE CLOSER TO THE ISRAELI POSITION THAN  
TO THE ARAB POSITION. ((PASSAGE OMITTED))

((QUESTION)) FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF THE KISSINGER TALKS  
THERE WAS A FEELING THAT THE SKIES WERE FALLING ON US.

((ANSWER)) WHOSE FEELING?

((QUESTION)) AMONG THE PUBLIC.

((ANSWER)) AMONG THE PUBLIC, YES, BECAUSE A SECTION TRIED TO  
DESCRIBE THE SITUATION IN VERY SERIOUS TERMS. I DON'T WANT TO  
SAY THAT WE ARE NOT IN A DIFFICULT PERIOD. THERE IS AN EXISTING  
ARAB REALITY WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH EXISTED BEFORE  
THE YOM KIPPUR WAR AND THERE IS ALSO A DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL  
REALITY, BUT THE DESCRIPTION OF OUR SITUATION AFTER THE SUSPENSION  
OF THE TALKS WAS EXAGGERATED AND I THINK THAT TIME HAS PROVED  
THIS.

((QUESTION)) GOING BACK TO THE CLEARING IN THE ATMOSPHERE  
WHICH HAS OCCURRED. IS IT TRUE TO SAY THAT AN ISRAELI  
CLARIFICATION OF THE QUESTION: WHAT KIND OF A STATE WE WANT--  
THAT IS, WHAT IS THE ULTIMATE AIM--WOULD HELP US? HAS THE HOUR  
NOT COME TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION?

((ANSWER)) IT WOULD BE CORRECT TO SAY THAT SINCE WE HAVE  
STOPPED DEALING IN THE ROGERS PLAN THERE HAS BEEN AN AMERICAN  
POLICY OF NOT PRESENTING PEACE PLANS OF THEIR OWN, BECAUSE OF THE  
RECOGNITION THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS NOT  
BASED ON CONSENT BETWEEN THE SIDES--EVEN IN INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS--  
WOULD NOT BE AN AGREEMENT OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE.

JUNE 1, 1975

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ASY

THE IM No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/11 : LOC-HAK-158-2-2-2 IT  
AND THE AMERICAN AIM HAS BEEN, AND I HOPE IT WILL CONTINUE TO BE SO  
IN THE FUTURE, TO SEARCH FOR WAYS TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE  
POSITIONS. PREVIOUS ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS HAVE MADE VERY SERIOUS  
EFFORTS TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE UNITED STATES ON THE  
QUESTION OF BORDERS. THESE EFFORTS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED ANY AGREEMENT  
BETWEEN THE SIDES.

((QUESTION)) WHY?

((ANSWER)) BECAUSE THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT COMMITTED  
THEMSELVES TO US ON A POSITION WHICH IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO  
EGYPT, JUST AS I HOPE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO REFRAIN FROM  
COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO EGYPT ON A POSITION WHICH IS NOT  
ACCEPTABLE TO US. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS THE ONLY ELEMENTS  
WHICH CAN REALLY PLAY THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR WITH THE AIM OF  
ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES, BECAUSE ITS APPROACH IS  
DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OF PART OF THE  
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THE MOMENT THAT IT COMES FORWARD WITH A  
POSITION OF ITS OWN IT WILL LOSE ITS ABILITY TO BE THE ELEMENT  
ACCEPTABLE TO THE SIDES AS A MEDIATOR AND CHANNEL FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

IF IT HAS A POSITION OF ITS OWN THEN ONE OF THE SIDES AGREES  
WITH IT AND THUS IT LOSES ITS ABILITY TO MANEUVER. THE UNITED  
STATES UNDERSTANDS THIS COMPLETELY IN VIEW OF THE FAILURE OF THE  
ROGERS PLAN. HOWEVER, TO MY GREAT REGRET THIS HAS NOT BEEN  
UNDERSTOOD BY THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HAS PREFERRED, OUT OF ITS  
DESIRE TO STRESS ITS RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES, TO BE  
ON THEIR SIDE CONTINUOUSLY. HENCE, THE SOVIET UNION HAS LOST  
ITS VALUE AS AN ELEMENT IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS EVEN IN THE EYES  
OF THE ARABS.

((QUESTION)) IS IT CORRECT TO ASSUME THAT IN HIS TALKS WITH YOU  
AND WITH AS-SADAT, PRESIDENT FORD WILL NOT SUGGEST AN AMERICAN  
PLAN OF HIS OWN?

((ANSWER)) I DO NOT WANT TO COMMIT MYSELF TO WHAT PRESIDENT  
FORD WILL OR WON'T DO. I HAVE REASON TO ASSUME THAT--AS WE WERE  
INFORMED--THE MEETINGS WITH AS-SADAT AND WITH ME ARE PART OF THE  
REASSESSMENT PROCESS AND THAT THERE WILL BE NO CONCLUSION OF THE  
ASSESSMENT UNTIL AFTER THE TALKS. THAT IS, THEY CAN EXAMINE  
VIEWS BUT THEY WILL NOT COME FORWARD WITH A POSITION. IF WE  
ACCEPT WHAT WAS SAID TO US, AND I DO ACCEPT IT--I HAVE TO BELIEVE  
THAT THE PROCESS OF REASSESSMENT WILL CONTINUE UNTIL AFTER THE  
TWO MEETINGS.

((QUESTION)) IS IT POSSIBLE TO EXPECT THE PROCESS OF REASSESSMENT  
TO GIVE BIRTH TO AN AMERICAN PLAN?

((ANSWER)) I DON'T WANT TO PROPHECY. I HAVE NO AUTHORITY  
FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO SAY DEFINITELY "NO". I THINK THIS WOULD  
BE A MISTAKE ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES IF IT DOES SO,  
BECAUSE IT WOULD LOSE ITS ABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY AS A BODY  
SERVING AS AN ACTIVE CHANNEL IN THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL  
NEGOTIATIONS. BECAUSE THE MOMENT IT ADOPTS A STAND, THEN: TAKE  
IT OR LEAVE IT. SINCE THE ROGERS PLAN THERE HAS BEEN AN AMERICAN  
POSITION NOT TO COME FORWARD WITH A PLAN OF THEIR OWN.

((QUESTION)) DO YOU THINK THAT THIS STAND HAS CHANGED?

((ANSWER)) I DO NOT SAY SO, BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT IT  
NECESSARILY HAS TO BE IDENTICAL. 30 MAY AA/ERCK/SZ 01/1050Z JUN MORE

ATTN PETER RODMAN, SECRETARY'S PARTY  
TAØ1Ø747Y TAKE 2 OF 4--RABIN AL HAMISHMAR INTERVIEW  
TEL AVIV 'AL HAMISHMAR SUPPLEMENT 3Ø 75 XXX TO BE IDENTICAL.

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((TXCERPTS)) ((QUESTION)) WOULD YOU CONSIDER IT A MISTAKE TO EXPLAIN IN PUBLIC THE PRINCIPLES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT?

((ANSWER)) IF WE ENTER NEGOTIATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT THEN WE SHALL HAVE TO COME FORWARD WITH DEFINITE POSITIONS. I DO NOTT THINK THE WORLD WILL MARVEL AT ISRAEL IF WE DEFINE THE BEST POSSIBLY ATTAINABLE PEACE BY AN "X" NUMBER OF PARAGRAPHS. WHOEVER THINKS OF IMPRESSING THE WORLD BY PRESENTING 2Ø RPT 2Ø ARTICLES OF PEACE IS MISTAKEN, BECAUSE THEY WISH TO RECEIVE FROM US A COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE OF ALL THE COMPONENTS OF PEACE. ((AS PUBLISHED)) HOWEVER, FROM THE ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE IS UNDOUBTEDLY PART OF THE QUESTION OF WHAT KIND OF PEACE THE ARABS ARE READY FOR. THEREFORE, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO RAISE SUCH A PROPOSAL AT PRESENT, AND I DO NOTT ADVISE THAT WE DRAW PRECISE OUTLINES FOR PUBLIC PRESENTATION. IT IS ENOUGH THAT WE HAVE CLARIFIED A FEW PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE INTENDED MAP.

((QUESTION)) WHICH ARE?

((ANSWER)) WE SAID THAT IN RETURN FOR PEACE--A PEACE TREATY-- WE SHALL BE PREPARED TO RETURN MOST OF THE SINAI AND DEMILITERIZE IT. WE ALSO SAID WE WANT AN ISRAELI PRESENCE AT OR CONTROL OF SHARAM-ASH-SHAYKH, INCLUDING TERRITORIAL CONTINUITY WITH IT. AS FOR THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT EVEN WITH A PEACE AGREEMENT WE DO NOTT WANT TO COME DOWN FROM THE HEIGHTS. WE HAVE NOT DETERMINED A LINE NOR ARE WE STICKING TO THE PRESENT ONE.

((QUESTION)) WHEN YOU SAY "WE DO NOTT WANT TO COME DOWN", DOES THIS MEAN THAT WE WILL NOTT COME DOWN?

((ANSWER)) WE WILL NOTT COME DOWN.

((QUESTION)) ON ANOTHER OCCASION YOU SAID, "WE SHALL KEEP CERTAIN FOOTHOLDS ON THE HEIGHTS".

((ANSWER)) I SAID: EVEN WITH A PEACE AGREEMENT WE SHALL NOTT DESCEND FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, WHICH DOES NOTT MEAN STICKING TO THE PRESENT LINE.

((QUESTION)) SHOULD THERE BE ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS WITH THE SYRIANS REGARDING AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT?

((ANSWER)) I DID NOTT SAY SO. IN MY OPINION THERE CANNOT BE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, BECAUSE OF SYRIA'S STAND AND BECAUSE OF THE LIMITED TERRITORIAL SPACE. THERE I SEE A NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT.

((QUESTION)) AN IMPRESSION PREVAILS THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS IS FORMING WHICH WILL RECOGNIZE THE 1967 RPT 1967 ISRAELI BOUNDARIES, ACCOMPANIED BY SECURITY AMENDMENTS. IS THERE NO FEAR OF FINDING OURSELVES THE ONLY ELEMENT NOTT ABLE TO DISCERN THIS INTERNATIONAL "CONSPIRACY"?

4.

((ANSWER)) A SIMILAR CONCESUS HAS ALREADY BEEN CRYSTALLIZED IN THE PAST. THERE WAS THE ROGERS PLAN IN 1969 RPT 1969, WHICH IN FACT WAS NEVER REALIZED. THE SITUATION IS DIFFERENT TODAY--AND FOR THE BETTER--FROM THE ONE IN WHICH WE FOUND OURSELVES IN 1968-69 RPT 1968-69. BOTH THE JORDAN PLAN, WITH RUSK'S SEVEN POINTS, AND THE ROGERS PLAN WERE MORE OR LESS BASED ON THE RETURN TO THE 1967 RPT 1967 BOUNDARIES. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THIS PLAN DID NOT TURN INTO A CONCRETE POLITICAL PLAN. THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES HAVE, THEREFORE, NOT CHANGED IN PRINCIPLE. NEITHER THE EUROPEANS, WHO HAVE POSSIBLY EVEN SOFTENED, NOR THE RUSSIANS AND CERTAINLY NOT THE UNITED STATES, WHICH SINCE 1970 RPT 1970 HAS NOT PRESENTED THE ROGERS PLAN AS ITS OWN POLITICAL PROGRAM. IT IS POSSIBLE TO SAY THAT, AS COMPARED TO THE PAST, THE SITUATION HAS IMPROVED AND NOT WORSENEED. WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE--WHO KNOWS?

((QUESTION)) YOU HAVE IGNORED JUDAEA AND SAMARIA UP TO NOW. THERE ARE PLANS REFERRING TO SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD GUARD THE JEWISH CHARACTER OF THIS REGION. WE HAVE NOT HEARD ANY CLEAR DEFINITION FROM YOU REGARDING GIVING BACK JUDAEA AND SAMARIA.

((ANSWER)) TWO ISSUES ARE WRAPPED TOGETHER IN THE ALINEMENT PLATFORM: SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. A VERY CLEAR POSITION IS DEFINED IN IT: IN THE ORIGINAL LAND OF ISRAEL THERE IS ROOM FOR ONLY TWO STATES. THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE HAS TO BE EXPRESSED THROUGH A PALESTINIAN IDENTITY WITHIN A JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN STATE AND THERE IS NO ROOM FOR A THIRD STATE. THE BORDER BETWEEN THE TWO STATES IS SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS.

((QUESTION)) A DECLARATION WAS MADE REGARDING THE SECURITY BOUNDARIES: WE WILL NOT MOVE FROM THE JORDAN RIVER.

((ANSWER)) NO INTERPRETATION WAS GIVEN TO THE FACT THAT THE JORDAN CONSTITUTES ISRAEL'S SECURITY BORDER. THE MEANING WAS NOT DETERMINED.

((QUESTION)) WELL THEN, WHAT IS THE MEANING?

((ANSWER)) I DO NOT WISH TO ENTER INTO THIS. I WANT TO REMIND YOU THAT EVEN THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT DECIDED (NOT AS A GOVERNMENT DECISION) TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBLE EXTENT THIS COULD CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE THEN AND UNTIL THIS DAY MANY GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING THE PRESENT ONE, HAVE REEXAMINED THIS ISSUE. THE ANSWER HAS BEEN THAT IT COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE SEPTEMBER 1974, SINCE THE RABAT CONFERENCE, A QUESTION HAS EXISTED ABOUT JORDAN BEING A PARTNER TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT EAST OF ISRAEL. WE CONTINUE TO EXAMINE AND BELIEVE THAT JORDAN IS THE COUNTRY WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO REACH A PEACE SETTLEMENT REGARDING OUR EASTERN BORDER. 30 MAY

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TA010810Y TAKE 3 OF 4--RABIN 'AL HAMISHMAR INTERVIEW  
TEL AVIV 'AL HAMISHMAR SUPPLEMENT 30 75 XXX OUR EASTERN BORDER. 5

((EXCERPTS)) ((QUESTION)) IF WE ARE TO BE UP TO DATE SHOULD WE NOW OFFER HUSAYN SOMETHING TO PREVENT HIS JOINING AN EASTERN FRONT?

((ANSWER)) THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY AT PRESENT OF ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, A PEACE AGREEMENT, WITH ANY ONE ARAB COUNTRY SEPARATELY. WE TRIED IT--BOTH PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS AND THE PRESENT ONE--AND FOUND OUT THAT NO SUCH POSSIBILITY EXISTS.

((QUESTION)) NAMELY, THERE CANNOT BE ANY DEALINGS WITH THE JORDANIAN ISSUE PRIOR TO GENEVA?

((ANSWER)) I DID NOT SAY SO. HOWEVER, NOT IN REGARD TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. NOT BECAUSE WE ARE NOT READY, BUT BECAUSE IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER JORDAN HAS THE NECESSARY MANDATE. DURING KISSINGER'S SHUTTLE TOUR EGYPT CATEGORICALLY TOLD US: ON NO ACCOUNT WILL THERE BE A SEPARATE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT WITH US. NO ARAB STATE WILL SIGN A SEPARATE PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, NOT EVEN WITHIN THE 1967 RPT 1967 BOUNDARIES.

((QUESTION)) WE HAVE ACTED A LONG TIME ACCORDING TO THE THESIS THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES. WAS THIS ERRONEOUS?

((ANSWER)) I DO NOT WISH TO ENTER INTO THE QUESTION ABOUT WHAT THESIS WE FOLLOWED. HOWEVER, IT WAS SHOWN THAT EGYPT IS PREPARED FOR A SEPARATE INTERIM SETTLEMENT. THEY NEGOTIATED WITH US AND WE DID NOT ACCEPT THEIR CONCRETE TERMS, BUT THE ISSUE OF THEIR UNPREPAREDNESS TO MAKE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH US WAS NEVER RAISED.

((QUESTION)) NOW, ON THE THRESHOLD OF FURTHER TALKS CONCERNING A SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT, IS IT TRUE TO SAY THAT WE ADHERE TO A QUID PRO QUO WHICH IS NOTHING BUT A PERIOD OF TIME, OR TO A QUID PRO QUO WHICH ALSO INCLUDES POLITICAL COMPONENTS?

((ANSWER)) AT THE MEETING WITH FORD ALL THE POSSIBILITIES, FROM ISRAEL'S SIDE, FOR ADVANCEMENT TOWARD PEACE WILL BE RAISED. THE GOVERNMENT WILL DECIDE WHAT IS PREFERABLE FOR WHAT AND WHICH DIRECTION TO BE PREFERRED OVER ANOTHER. WHEN A LIMITED INTERIM AGREEMENT IS DISCUSSED WE SHALL EXAMINE IT ACCORDING TO FOUR CRITERIA: A) IN WHAT MEASURE IT ADVANCES US TOWARD PEACE, EVEN AS A CONCRETE, SYMBOLIC NUCLEUS FOR MOVES WHICH CONSTITUTE PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE. B) ENFORCING THE LIMITATION OF THE USE OF FORCE AS A MEANS OF REACHING A SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT, SINCE THE ISSUE IN A LIMITED INTERIM AGREEMENT IS NOT THE ENDING OF THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY. WHEN WE DECIDED TO DISCUSS A LIMITED AGREEMENT, WE DID IT ON THE BASIS OF A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY STILL EXISTING. C) THE PERIOD OF THE AGREEMENT'S EFFECTIVENESS, NOT ONLY VERBALLY BUT PRACTICALLY. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE PERIOD OF THE AGREEMENT'S EFFECTIVENESS

IS NOT DETERMINED BY GENERAL FORMULAS BUT FIRST AND FOREMOST BY THE PERIOD OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MANDATE OF THE UN FORCES STATIONED IN THE BUFFER ZONE AND SUPERVISING THE GENERAL COMPONENTS OF THE AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE THINNING OUT OF FORCES. IN THIS SPHERE I REGARD THE EGYPTIAN REPLY AS MOST UNSATISFACTORY. D) LINES AND ARRANGEMENTS IN THE AREA UNDER CONDITIONS OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS NOT AN END TO THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY. UNDER THAT CIRCUMSTANCE, I DO NOT SEE ANY POSSIBILITY OF ISRAEL GIVING UP THE PASSES, OR A CONSIDERABLE PART OF THEM, AS A DEFENSE LINE AND I SHALL NOT ENTER INTO THE QUESTION OF WHICH PART EXACTLY. AT THE SAME TIME, HAD WE BEEN SATISFIED POLITICALLY REGARDING THE PERIOD OF THE AGREEMENT'S EFFECTIVENESS, THE OIL ISSUE, WITH ALL ITS IMPORTANCE--AND I REGARD IT AS LESS IMPORTANT THAN INSURING A DEFENSE LINE BASED ON A CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE CREST WHICH BLOCKS THE WAY INTO SINAI--WE WOULD HAVE SETTLED.

((QUESTION)) DO WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR STIPULATION IN REGARD TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PASSES IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE 5 JUNE EVENT? NAMELY, THAT ONCE THE CANAL IS REOPENED TO NAVIGATION, DOES IT NOT LIMIT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A DEFENSE LINE BY THE MERE FACT OF CIVILIAN TRAFFIC PASSING IN THE CANAL?

((ANSWER)) THE EXISTENCE OF TRAFFIC PASSING THROUGH THE CANAL IS A FACTOR VARIOUSLY ESTIMATED IN EGYPT, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ESTIMATE OF INCOME OF HALF A BILLION DOLLARS: '90--4 8, 5#3 18

5 63-4. HOWEVER, IN MY OPINION, IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THERE IS A SERIOUS BASIS FOR THE ASSUMPTION THAT AN OPEN CANAL WILL OBLIGE EGYPT TO REFRAIN FROM WAR.

((QUESTION)) MEANING THAT IT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A PEACEFUL GESTURE?

((ANSWER)) NO. IT IS A GESTURE OF NORMALIZING EGYPTIAN LIFE IN THE CANAL AREA. AS-SADAT, TOO, DOES NOT SAY IT IS A GESTURE OF PEACE.

((QUESTION)) DO YOU ESTIMATE THAT THE EGYPTIANS WILL TRANSFER SOME FORCES FOLLOWING THE REOPENING OF THE CANAL?

((ANSWER)) I BELIEVE THAT EGYPT WILL RESPECT ITS UNDERTAKINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SEPARATION OF FORCES AGREEMENT.

TRANSFERRING FORCES IS A VIOLATION OF THE THINNING-OUT AGREEMENT. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT EGYPT, WHICH UNDERTOOK AN OBLIGATION BY THE VERY SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT, WOULD DO SUCH A THING. IF THE CANAL IS REOPENED ISRAEL WILL REGARD IT WITH A FRIENDLY EYE.

((QUESTION)) SHOULD ISRAEL CONTRIBUTE TO THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS ALONG THE CANAL AREA, NAMELY--SHOULD THERE BE A PARALLEL ISRAELI GESTURE?

((ANSWER)) I SHALL NOT ENTER INTO DETAILS AS TO ISRAEL'S FUTURE MOVES. 30 MAY 75 TR/ERCK/NE MORE 01/1225Z JUN

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ATTN PETER RODMAN, SECRETARY'S PARTY  
TA010928Y TAKE 4 OF 4--ARABIN AL HAMISHMAR INTERVIEW  
TEL AVIV 'AL HAMISHMAR SUPPLEMENT 30 75 XXX ISRAEL'S FUTURE  
MOVES. 7.

((EXCERPTS)) ((QUESTION)) WHY?

((ANSWER)) THINK THAT EGYPT'S DECISION TO REOPEN THE CANAL IS NOTT A GESTURE TOWARD ISRAEL. IT IS FIRST AND FOREMOST A GESTURE TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, TOWARD EUROPE AND A MOVE INTENDED TO INFLUENCE AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. ISRAEL WAS EGYPT'S LAST CONSIDERATION. IN MY OPINION IT IS A STEP WHICH WAS INTENDED TO CREATE A BETTER ATMOSPHERE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE CONCESSIONS TO WHICH ISRAEL HAD NOTT AGREED TO IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS.

((QUESTION)) COMMONSENSE DICTATES THAT AN OPEN CANAL, WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE SOVIET UNION TO INCREASE ITS POWER IN THE PERSIAN GULF, MUST ENCOURAGE A MORE POSITIVE AMERICAN VIEW OF ISRAEL AS ITS ALLY IN OUR AREA?

K(ANSWER)) THE SOVIET NAVY COULD HAVE PASSED THROUGH THE CANAL THE MOMENT IT WAS CLEANED AND WITHOUT IT BEING OPENED TO COMMERCIAL NAVIGATION. THE MOMENT WE WITHDREW FROM THE CANAL AND THE EGYPTIANS DECIDED TO CLEAR IT, WHETHER IT WAS REOPENED TO COMMERCIAL NAVIGATION OR NOTT, THE SOVIETS HAD A NAVAL AXIS FOR TRANSFERRING FORCES FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN TO THE RED SEA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN. I DO NOTT THINK THIS WILL INFLUENCE AMERICAN CONSIDERATIONS.

((QUESTION)) ASSUMING THAT A PARTIAL SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS TO SUICIDE IF SOME OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES CONSIDER IT PART OF THE PLAN TO LIQUIDATE ISRAEL, WOULDN'T IT BE RIGHT TO STRUGGLE FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT AND MOBILIZE JEWISH AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION FOR THIS PURPOSE?

((ANSWER)) I DO NOTT CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT, BECAUSE THE MOMENT WE ENTER INTO THE DETAILS OF THE OVERALL AGREEMENT WE WILL FACE A KNOWN ARAB POSITION: WITHDRAWAL TO THE 1967 RPT 1967 LINES ON ALL FRONTS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A 'ARAFATITE STATE IN AJUDAEA AND SAMARIA AND THE GAZA STRIP--AND THIS NOTT IN RETURN FOR PEACE, BUT IN RETURN FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY OR PEACE THE WAY AS-SADAT AND AL-ASAD INTERPRET IT. 'ARAFAT HAS SAID WHAT HE WANTS OPENLY. HE IS PREPARED TO CONTENT HIMSELF WITH SUCH A STATE AT THIS STAGE, BUT HE HAS NOTT GIVEN UP THE CENTRAL IDEA, WHICH IS THE POLITICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS-- TO LIQUIDATE ISRAEL AS A SOVEREIGN STATE. I DO NOTT UNDERSTAND WHY OUR SITUATION WILL BE BETTER WHEN WE ARRIVE AT A CONFRONTATION WITH THIS POSITION? FOR THE TIME BEING, I DO NOTT SEE THAT IF THERE IS ARAB AGREEMENT IT IS AROUND AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT AND THAT IF THERE IS NO ARAB AGREEMENT IT IS AROUND THE INTERIM SETTLEMENT ISSUE.

((QUESTION)) IN AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT DO WE RISK  
CRYSTALLIZING AN ARAB FRONT?

((ANSWER)) THERE IS AN ARAB FRONT AND A COMMITMENT BY ALL THE  
ARAB STATES ON THE OVERALL SETTLEMENT ISSUE.

((QUESTION)) ALSO BY HUSAYN? IS IT SERIOUS?

((ANSWER)) HUSAYN DEFINITELY CANNOT PROCEED TO AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT

NT  
SEPARATELY. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OF THIS EXPLICITLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY  
THROUGH THE AMERICANS. WITH REGARD TO AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT  
THERE IS AN ARAB COMMITMENT AT THIS STAGE. IF IT BECOMES  
APPARENT THAT THE CONDITIONS OF THE INTERIM SETTLEMENT ARE SUCH  
THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT THEM, IT WILL BE OUR DUTY TO CONTINUE THE  
POLITICAL MOVEMENT. I AM AGAINST A FREEZE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY,  
AND IF WE HAVE TO TACKLE AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT, WE WILL TACKLE  
IT AND STRUGGLE OVER IT. HOWEVER, THERE IS AN ARAB COMMITMENT  
REGARDING SUCH A SETTLEMENT.

((QUESTION)) WHAT ARE WE EXPECTED TO FACE AT THE GENEVA  
CONFERENCE IF IT RECONVENES? WILL WE WORK IN JOINT COMMITTEES  
FOR SEPARATE SETTLEMENTS WITH EACH ONE OF THE ARAB  
STATES?

((ANSWER)) IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT AT LEAST TWO SIDES  
EXIST IN EVERY POLITICAL MOVE: THE ARABS AND US. IN ADDITION  
TO THAT THE TWO BIG POWERS WILL ALSO BE IN GENEVA. OUR INTENTION,  
IF WE GO TO GENEVA, IS FIRST OF ALL TO INSURE THAT THE COMPOSITION  
OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN IT WILL BE THE SAME AS IN THE PREVIOUS  
GENEVA CONFERENCE SESSION, AND THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WILL TAKE  
PLACE IN SUBCOMMITTEES ON A BILATERAL BASIS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND  
EACH ONE OF THE STATES. A THIRD THING--WHICH IS THE FIRST SUBJECT  
FOR DISCUSSION--IS THE QUESTION OF WHAT SORT OF PEACE ARE  
WE TALKING ABOUT, SINCE THE AIM OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE  
IS TO ACHIEVE PEACE. THE NATURE OF THE MAP WHICH ISRAEL WILL  
PRESENT WILL BE LINKED TO THE NATURE OF PEACE. AT ANY RATE,  
WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE RETURN TO THE 1967 RPT 1967 BORDERS  
AS POSSIBLE. ((PASSAGE OMITTED))

((QUESTION)) THERE IS AN IMPRESSION AMONG THE PEOPLE THAT YOU  
DISPLAY A HAWKISH COLOR. ARE YOU A HAWK WITH REGARD TO THE  
ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES, NAMELY, THE SHAPE OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL,  
OR ONLY WITH REGARD TO THE WAY WHICH LEADS TO IT?

((ANSWER)) I DO NOT ENGAGE IN DEFINITIONS. I HAVE EXPLAINED  
MY EXACT POSITION. WHAT IS IT? YOU DECIDE. BASICALLY,  
BELIEVE THAT EVERYTHING MUST BE DONE TO MAINTAIN A POLITICAL  
PROCESS WHILE INSURING MILITARY STRENGTH. IN RETURN FOR PEACE  
I AM PREPARED FOR FAR-REACHING CONCESSIONS, BUT NOT TO RETURN  
TO THE 1967 RPT 1967 BORDERS. I AM PREPARED TO ADVANCE TOWARD  
PEACE ALSO THROUGH INTERIM SETTLEMENTS, BUT WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING  
THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. ((PASSAGE OMITTED)) 30 MAY  
MK/ERCK/NE ENDALL 01/1300Z JUN

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